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**WHICH SIDE ARE WE ON? THE EFFECT OF SELF-IDENTIFIED CLASS ON  
POLITICAL ELECTIONS IN VIRGINIA**

An honors paper submitted to the Department of Political Science and International Affairs  
of the University of Mary Washington  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for Departmental Honors

Benjamin Fredrick Hermerding

April 2015

By signing your name below, you affirm that this work is the complete and final version of your paper submitted in partial fulfillment of a degree from the University of Mary Washington. You affirm the University of Mary Washington honor pledge: "I hereby declare upon my word of honor that I have neither given nor received unauthorized help on this work."

Benjamin Fredrick Hermerding  
(digital signature)

04/30/15

# Which Side Are We On?

## The Effect of Self-Identified Class on Political Elections in Virginia

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### Abstract

Inequality is rising in the United States. One of the possible ramifications of this trend could be a shift in the political landscape over the next couple decades. In particular, Americans could become more divided politically on class-based lines due to the economic strain put on the working class. Using data from the University of Mary Washington's Center for Leadership and Media Studies' 2014 Survey, this paper strives to explore the current landscape of class-based politics. First, it explores if class-based politics are still salient in Virginia by examining if there is a correlation between an individuals' self-defined class and various political beliefs. If not, then it explores why class-based politics do not affect political choices.

Over the course of the last 25 years, the United States has seen an increase in inequality. The Gini coefficient, an oft-used measurement of inequality, shows the United States moving toward a more unequal society. The Congressional Budget Office found the Gini coefficient “rose from 0.48 in 1979 to 0.59 in 2007,” and the United States Census Bureau found the Gini coefficient rose from 0.40 in the 1979s to 0.47 in 2010 (Dadush 2012: 6). Accompanying the rise in inequality are “worrying factors” like “increased prevalence of poverty, increased macroeconomic instability,” and increased spending on “positional goods” (Dadush 2012: 25). But there are other ramifications from increased inequality as well.

Politicians have started to notice the growth of income inequality in the United States and have begun to respond accordingly, often striking a more populist tone that speaks to the working class. Former Florida Governor Jeb Bush, who is currently the top polling candidate in numerous GOP 2016 presidential primary polls (e.g. Agiesta 2015, ABC News/Washington Post 2015), said in a speech in Detroit recently: “The opportunity gap is the defining issue of our time. More Americans are stuck at their income levels than ever before. It’s very hard for people to go from the bottom rungs of the economy to the top or even the middle. This should alarm you. It has alarmed me” (Vox 2015).

Former Secretary of State and 2016 Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton has talked about income inequality as well. In her 2016 presidential announcement, Clinton said: “Americans have fought their way back from tough

economic times. But the deck is still stacked in favor of those at the top. Everyday Americans need a champion” (Clinton 2015).

But because American politicians are speaking about an issue does not necessarily mean the issue matters to ordinary Americans. This purpose of this paper is to find if American politicians are correct in assuming the growth of inequality matters to Americans when deciding their political beliefs. To do so, the paper will explore if there is a correlation between self-defined class in Virginians and their basic political opinions. If so, it will explore why there is the correlation. If not, it will explore why the correlation does not exist.

After all, the implications of the class can have drastic effects. In 2014 alone, United States candidates for public office spent \$3,665,416,368 on elections, a number that has increased dramatically over the last decade (Open Secrets 2014). A better understanding of the effect of class on voting would have huge consequences for campaign microtargeting, not to mention shape the way Americans view politics and the actors therein.

### **History of Class**

Class has affected American society since colonial times. One of the most striking examples of pre-revolutionary class was the Deep South. Antebellum southerners were divided into very clear groups based on their income (and, as was the norm at the time, the color of one’s skin): the landed aristocracy; the poor, but free, yeoman; and the enslaved African-Americans. Many of America’s Founding Fathers

came from this system in Virginia and were slave-owners themselves: George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison (Greene 2000).

Frontier America became an important breeding ground of a different type of class system. Free land for free men set up a system in which all those who moved west started as equals, no one had a past. Life on the plains was difficult, which meant that settlers often had to rely on one another. These factors led to the American West being fairly egalitarian. This egalitarianism, coupled with a strong hatred of the northeast and the railroad barons, led to the rise of Prairie Populism in the mid-19th century (Hicks 1961, Peffer and Argersinger 1991).

The history of class identification in the United States is not free of violence. Like other countries, the United States has seen its fair share of political infighting over class issues. One of the most significant class based event in United States history was the Haymarket affair. Following three days of strikes and the killing of two striking workers in Chicago on May 3, 1884, union and socialist leaders called for strikes in Haymarket Square. The next day, the protesters assembled and rallied until the police came to break up the crowd. Shortly after the lead officer called for the rally to stop, someone threw a bomb in front of the police and gunfire broke out. The ensuing violence left 11 dead and many more wounded (David 1958).

Even as recently as 2011, the United States saw a fight over economic injustice. The national Occupy movement, which started as the Occupy Wall Street movement, had a very populist message. It highlighted the struggles of the working and middle class, calling on political leaders to change policies in support of these classes.

Occupy's catchphrase "We are the 99%," as opposed to the wealthy "1%," lent itself to the lower classes and their struggle. (Calhoun 2013)

Like most class-based demonstrations in the United States, neither the Haymarket affair nor the Occupy movement made any immediate changes to the socioeconomic landscape. However, as a consequence of the Haymarket affair, the United States moved a step closer to an eight-hour workday (David 1958). Occupy, on the other hand, so far has had less time for its consequences to percolate.

### **What is social class?**

America is divided into classes, different rungs on a socioeconomic ladder, but how does one define a class? What does it mean if someone is working class? Or middle class? In order to determine one's class, many different factors need to be taken into account: income, access to capital, position in society, etc. Then, one must look at the effect of how these different factors affect one another and which ones matter most.

Perhaps the most internationally influential class theory is Karl Marx's theory of class. Marx argued that all class is derived from one's position in the means of production. He wrote that human social organization started around the satisfaction of basic human needs, meaning society is organized around the production of goods that fulfill those needs- the economy. Marx defines two distinct classes based on his theory of social organization and its relationship with the means of production: the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. The proletariat produces goods that fulfill human needs and are therefore employed by others, and the bourgeoisie are the owners of the means of productions and can purchase the labor of others- the proletariat. Of course, Marx

ultimately wanted the self-identification of the proletariat, which, he argued, would lead to the inevitable overthrow of the capitalist system (Marx, 1867).

In opposition to Marx's economic basis of class was Max Weber's stratified theory of societal order. Weber argued there was more to societal order than economic position alone. In fact, Weber asserted society divides itself into three groups: classes, status groups, and parties. According to Weber, classes are "bases for communal action," not "communities." Essentially, classes are just groups of people that have the common "life chances." That is, their economic situation in terms of "possession of goods and opportunities for income" is similar. Communities, he argues, arrange themselves into hierarchies and people fit themselves into these hierarchies, which often do not depend on an individual's class or property ownership. By parties, Weber does not refer to the modern, American idea of political parties. Instead, he defined parties as groups that acquire "social power," which is the ability for an individual to have their desires met despite opposition. These determinants create a pliable system of societal order, which changes depending on the circumstances of the time (Weber, Gerth, and Mills 1946, Bendix 1960).

It has been 131 years since Karl Marx's death, and 94 years since Max Weber's, but the definition of class remains unsolved. Since Marx and Weber's death, class theorists have moved beyond their definition of classes but have kept the roots of their ideas.

Some theorists retained Marx's idea of a society split between two social classes, but they argue these classes have decomposed into subclasses (Dahrendorf 1959,



Wright 1985). Neo-Marxists argue the “decomposition of labor” is why Marx’s working class revolution has not happened. The working class (proletariat) cannot be seen as a wholly singular group anymore (Dahrendorf 1959). For example, these workers could be divided into three independent groups: skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled (Clark and Lipset 1991).

Other theorists have diverged from Marx’s system of classes by creating multilevel systems, which compensate for Marx’s broad class definitions. For example, Erik Wright broke Marx’s two-category system into a 12-category system. His model includes groups going from proletariat to bourgeoisie, with categories such as small employers and top managers in between (Wright 1985).

Other theorists base their ideas on Weberian theory. In the context of America as a post-industrial state, these theories break up societies into different groups that play a stronger or weaker role, depending on the situation. For example, the idea of traditional classes has been broken up because a rise of new issue-based groups: religion, gender, race, etc. (Heath 1991). Others even argue that new forms of social classes are emerging. For example, as income rises, traditional hierarchies and collectivism are weakened. A weakening of these traditional models of societal order has led to an increased sense of individualism. However, Americans still need something around which to coalesce, which has led to new an increase in the relevance of non-class based strata (Clark and Lipset 1991).

### **Class Salience in a Modern Context**

Even if one can settle on one definition of class, there is the issue of class's salience in contemporary, American society. Does socioeconomic class still affect Americans' decision-making and what effect, if any, will it have in the future? Unsurprisingly, seeing as they cannot decide on a universal definition of class, theorists do not agree on whether class remains a salient part of Americans' lives.

One argument is that traditional, economic-based hierarchies are declining. These hierarchies support traditional socioeconomic classes by reaffirming "class-defined patterns in informal social relations, cultural outlooks, and support for social change" (Clark and Lipset 1991, 402). Large class divisions are caused by great differentiation between classes in society, and conversely, small class divisions are caused by small divisions between classes in society. However, the divisions among classes in society need not be income based. Like in Weberian theory, the differentiation can come from differences in status or power as well. For example, a society could be sharply divided into two classes (producers and owners) and have relatively similar income levels, but the classes are still bitterly divided (Clark and Lipset 1991).

The converse of both the above rules applies as well. If differentiation of traditional hierarchies declines, social classes decrease in relevance as well. For example, a society with little differentiation between its societal groups will likely have little class activity. However, the decrease in class conflict does not equate to less conflict overall. Conflict, instead, is organized around other issues (e.g. social issues

and race). Moreover, the less divided the classes are, the less likely that different groups would have distinct cultural differences (Clark and Lipset 1991).


The growth of the American economy has weakened traditional hierarchies, which, in turn, has weakened the traditional class system in America. Over the past one hundred years, the United States has emerged as the world's sole superpower, meaning more affluence for all Americans, and the creation of an expansive social safety net. As a result, many Americans can worry less than their ancestors did about material interests. More affluence has meant lower class Americans are not as reliant on material support from the upper class, which has led to a decrease in class consciousness and, as a consequence, a rise in individualism (Clark and Lipset 1991).

If a rise in affluence is what is fueling a breakdown in class consciousness in the United States, then rising economic inequality in the United States may soon break the trend. Economic inequality is rising in the United States, and the amount of taxes and governmental transfers that bring down inequality have also dropped. (Dadush 2012).

Figure 1

Percent change in real (inflation-adjusted) income

(Dadush 2012: 10)



Other, not-as-obvious variables are affecting how Americans view class as well. Variables like increased technological innovation, immigration and its effect on nepotism, and declining familial hierarchies have brought down the rates of class consciousness in the United States. In fact, the more societal hierarchies decline, the more traditional class identities decline (Clark and Lipset 1991).

Despite all the indications that social classes should be less prevalent in today's society, research indicates that American's self-identification of class has not changed drastically, although there has been modest change in favor of the middle class. In 1949, 49% of Americans identified themselves as part of the working class and 45% self-identified as members of the middle class (Centers 1949). By 2000, the number of

Americans who identified as members of the middle class had risen to 59% and the number of Americans who identified as members of the working class had fallen to 41%<sup>1</sup> (Hout 2007). Although these numbers show a growth in the middle class, they also indicate that class-consciousness is not dead in the United States, as a significant portion of the population still identifies with the working class.

But self-identifying with a social class does not conclusively mean that an American belongs to that class. For the most part, Americans understand social classes and can explain each class properly, although the term “working class” must often be prompted, likely because Americans would otherwise think of themselves as middle class (Hout 2007). However, Americans are not particularly good at naming their correct social class. Although a majority of working class Americans correctly identify their social class, “a substantial percentage inflates their class” (Sosnaud, Brady, and Frenk 2013: 90), half of middle class voters also have correctly correlate their perceived social class with their actual social class. However, upper-middle class voters overwhelmingly lower their actual class, with “more than 71 percent deflat[ing] their class position” (ibid: 90). When class was stratified into more categories than working, middle, and upper-middle class, Americans were even better at identifying their socioeconomic class. This signified most Americans are “familiar enough with class terminology to place themselves more or less where experts would put them...” (Hout 2007: 34).

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<sup>1</sup> I would like to add a word of caution when viewing these numbers as hard-and-fast support for a rising middle class. The late 1990s and early 2000s were a time of extraordinary growth in the United States and therefore would see an inflated view of household income and class status.

## **A Decline in Class Voting?**


Regardless of whether class consciousness is stable or declining, its effect on American elections is changing. For the most part, theorists agree class-based voting in the United States and in Western European democracies is declining (Heath 1991, Crewe 1986, Weakliem 1995). The ramifications from any change in political behavior in the United States are monumental, and a decrease in class-based voting is no exception.

Theorists who use a relative decrease in class voting believe “a modest process of class secularization probably did occur” (Heath 1991, 78). In this model, theorists determine vote totals based on how much each class votes for a political party on a yearly basis. Other scholars use the absolute model of political change, which shows that a decrease in class voting “definitely occurred.” This model takes a much broader look at the class system and instead views how much the entire system overall has changed (Crewe 1986, Weakliem 1995).

Perhaps the most visible example of supposed declining social class in America is the decrease in class-based voting. According to the Alford Index of Class Voting, working class-based voting for Left political parties has declined in every western country that has available data (Clark and Lipset 1991). The Alford Index of Class Voting shows what percentage of a given class vote for Left or Right parties. To find the Alford Index for a country’s Left party among working class voters, subtract the working class votes for the Right party from the working class votes for the Left party. The remaining is the Alford Index score (Alford 1962). Other mathematical models show a

decline in class-based voting as well. Harold Clarke's Consistency Voting Index is derived from the Alford Index of Class Voting but takes into account third parties as well (Clarke's research focuses primarily on British voters) (Clarke 2004). The Relative Class Voting Index takes the middle class's odds of voting for conservative parties divided by their odds of voting for liberal parties (Heath, Jowell, and Curtice 1985). Regardless of the model chosen, class-based voting in Western democracies is declining, which can be seen in the image below.

**Figure 2**



But, like the disagreement among theorists over the salience of class in American society and the very definition of class itself, scholars cannot agree what causes the decrease in class voting. In fact, some do not even believe class voting has decreased (e.g. Heath 1991).

Theories that explore a drop in class-based political activity are explained as a breakup of class-based, political ideology (reminiscent of Marx's view that "every class struggle is a political struggle" (Marx and Engels 1948)). Five major theories have emerged explaining this drop-off, which are outlined below (Goldthorpe and Clark 2001, Monza, Hout, and Brooks 1995). Of course, there are also many theorists who do not believe that there has been a decline in class-based voting (e.g. Bartels 2006, Pulzer 1987). These theories are presented juxtaposed to the drop-off theories.

First, there is a general "embourgeoisement" of the working class, although it is mostly an antiquated system of looking at class-based voting decline. That is, as members of the working class become more skilled, which lead to higher incomes and living standards, they "assimilate into middle-class society" (Moore 1966, cf. Goldthorpe 1968). Similarly, there is a "proletarianization" of white-collar workers. White-collar workers, largely members of the middle class, are adopting working class tendencies, like organizing themselves into labor unions (Jelin 1979). Affecting embourgeoisement and proletarianization is social mobility and occupational mobility. The more mobile a society is along these variables, the more likely citizens will be to identify with a middle class (Turner 1992, Weakliem 1995) or the more likely that they will identify with the class they are moving toward, rather than the class to which they belong (De Graff, Nieuwbeerta, and Heath 1995).<sup>2</sup> If embourgeoisement and proletarianization affects modern class consciousness, then Americans are moving toward believing they all belong to a universal middle class.

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<sup>2</sup> De Graff, Nieuwbeerta, and Heath find that there is an "acculturation to the class of destination" among mobile intergenerational groups.



Although the idea of highly skilled, working class individuals identifying with the middle class sounds theoretically sound, studies testing embourgeoisement have found little empirical evidence of its existence. (Goldthorpe 1968, Hamilton 1972). Likewise, social mobility has not been as strong as hypothesized by theorists who believe in class decay (Turner 1992). For these empirical reasons, embourgeoisement is seen as an antiquated way of looking at class-based voting decay.

Second, Americans are moving toward new divisions that are more important in post-industrial America than class divisions. New “identity” struggles are replacing old class bonds. These issues include the Gender and Sexual Minorities (GSM) equal rights movement, regional movements, and gender, race, and ethnicity movements (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, Heath 1991). These issues are not new societal divisions but have become more prominent in recent decades (Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995).

The idea of issue struggles becoming more prominent in American society than class is reminiscent of Weber’s “parties” and “communities.” The groups that coalesce around various social issues and thereby acquire “social power” create communities, which are not affected by members’ classes. These communities form parties, which are the groups actively working for change despite opposition (Weber 1946).

This movement does not mean lower classes support redistributive policies less. In fact, research indicates low--income households were more likely to support welfare policies than high--income households, including middle class households (Bobo 1991). Instead, class-based voting is becoming subordinate to other types of stratification.

The most prominent empirical explanation of class becoming subordinate to new, social division of society is the impact of race. These theorists claim that race has begun to take over class as a key element in voting. They use the Deep South as evidence of this trend, pointing to overwhelming African American support of the Democrats and majority white support of the Republicans after the civil rights laws in the 1960s. Democrats, they argue have become the party of racial equality, while Republicans have become the party that looks out for the interests of whites. This party reclassifying has led to members of every class becoming split between the two parties (Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989, Edsall and Edsall 1991).

However, theorists who claim that there is a continued significance of class in voting show that race is not a divisive issue among classes. They argue, "Significant dealignment may have begun in the 1960s as postulated by advocates of the racial realignment thesis," but "class voting indexes returned to levels found in the 1950s." This trend means that there is no significant dealignment of classes based on racial dynamics (Hout, Manza, and Brooks 1995).

Third, Americans are gradually becoming more educated, which fundamentally changes how they view themselves. Rather than being constricted to class loyalty, a more educated American citizenry identifies itself with and makes rational, political decisions based on an educated opinion. In making this change, Americans make decisions based on calculative, long-term determinations, rather than collective identities. (Dalton 2014, Heath 1991)

No consensus has been reached over the effect of a more educated populace, however. Although the issue has been explored in depth by researchers, scholars are unsure what the effects of a more educated populace are. As one scholar bluntly put it, most data was “still unused” (Smith 1989).

Four, fundamentally, the working class has decreased. As a proportion of the population, the manual, working class has declined, leaving the traditional left parties to absorb parts of the middle class, or ultimately, face endless defeat. However, by attracting middle class voters into the party, they “suffer a loss of opportunities among narrowly defined workers,” because the parties satisfy only the mutual interests of the two groups- working class and middle class- and therefore do not satiate the needs of the working class (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). These supra-class themes drive down the class-based vote, causing less class-based cleavages (Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995). On top of these divisions, some theorists argue that, as new, international, competitive markets emerge, new fragmentations emerge, as all classes of declining industries bind together for survival (Logan and Molotch 1987, Offe 1999).

Theorists who disagree with this model argue that Left parties have not lost a considerable number of votes compared with earlier periods. Since these parties did not lose votes despite a supposed drop in total working class voters, these parties were able to sustain their working class votes while incorporating new, middle class votes (Pulzer 1987). Furthermore, they assert that the new, competitive changes to international politics have not broken down class barriers and forced agreement among classes on economic issues (Hibbs 1982). Moreover, accompanying the new,

international economy are problems like declining rates of social mobility (Hout 1988), which will likely lead to more class polarization (Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1993).

Finally, the traditional, class-based left is being joined by a “New Left,” which is made up of members of the middle class (Inglehart 1990: 375). This group is made up of environmentalists, women, racial minorities, and the GSM community, among others. (Claus 1999) People take economic necessities for granted with an increase in wealth. Their focus instead turns to “life-style and amenities.” The issues these voters care about “social issues” rather than “traditional class political issues,” like fighting for “ownership and control of the means of production.” (Clark and Lipset 1991, 405) These groups being added to the political calculation muddies the waters, causing the traditionally united lower class to break apart. This phenomenon is especially relevant in younger generations, especially with young people from “more affluent and hierarchical societies.” (Clark and Lipset 1991) Young, middle class people have “postmaterialist” values, like those touted by the new left, more than older generations. The youth also focus less on “materialist” concerns more than older generations, issues that typically made up the bulk of concerns valued by the working class. Therefore, the older, working class generations, which valued “materialist” concerns and made up the old left, slowly are being replaced by newer, middle class generations, which emphasize “postmaterialist” values. These individuals are the most likely to transition from traditional class-based parties (Abramson and Inglehart 1992, Inglehart and Abramson 1994, Inglehart 1990).

In a study of 12 Western European states, André Freire found “social factors are a very important dimension in explaining individual left–right orientation” (Freire 2006: 371). The author performed a regression analysis on issues important to respondents when determining their position on a left-right spectrum on two surveys in 11 of the countries and one survey in one. He found “social factors” were the most important factor in determining left-right orientation in twelve cases, while “partisan orientation” was the most important factor in only eight of the 23 cases (ibid. 370). Therefore, the author argues, “social identities’ are gaining ground, particularly among the younger generations,” while “individuals’ positions within the social structure have been...of decreasing importance in the explanation of their left–right political orientations” (ibid. 372).

This trend can be seen particularly well in portions of the American Midwest. Thomas Frank describes in “What’s the Matter with Kansas?” that, as hot-button, “explosive” social issues become more important in the political discourse, working class, white Americans have been fleeing the Democratic Party in droves, making many Midwestern states (e.g. Kansas, Nebraska, and Oklahoma) among the darkest red states. However, many Midwesterners’ single-mindedness regarding social issues has led to state governments passing economic policies that do not benefit most people, especially those in the working class. Frank postulates his idea can be projected to social conservatives across the United States. Many social conservatives are from economically depressed classes and voting for conservative candidates constitutes voting against their own economic self-interest (Frank 2004).

Joseph Gerteis (1998) also found social issues are becoming less important for explaining the differences between the political left and right. In his study of the fragmentation of the American middle class, Gereis found, “Republican policies have alienated the party’s traditional middle-class support,” while a similar phenomenon has “afflicted the left” (ibid: 662). Gerteis’s research points toward a decline in the relevance of “traditional welfare-state issues,” such as national spending on welfare, for which Gerteis tested (ibid: 663). Instead, Gerteis’s research indicates toward the growing importance of social issues in defining how middle class Americans vote.

As Larry Bartels explains in “What’s the Matter with *What’s the Matter with Kansas?*” the idea that socially conservative voters are moving away from the Democratic Party and becoming more conservative is false. White, working class support for the Democratic Party has actually increased over the last 20 years. The ideological views of white, working class individuals have not changed either. In fact, social issues are less related to party identification than economic issues among working class voters, although social issues have become more related to voting preference in middle and upper class white voters (Bartels 2006).

Critics of the New Left theory point to foundational problems with the research behind it. For example, they point to Ronald Inglehart’s work, who is a prominent post-material theorist. In many of his works, Inglehart argues the theory that “new,” “postmaterial” social movements are overtaking old, “materialist” movements in post-industrial nations. The issues that matter to new generations are shifting away from “materialist concerns about economic and physical security toward greater emphasis on

freedom, self-expression, and the quality of life” (Inglehart and Abramson 1994, 336). He argues, these issues do not appeal to the lower classes, causing the working class disenfranchisement (Inglehart 1990, Abramson and Inglehart 1992, Inglehart and Abramson 1994).

But critics point to Inglehart’s definition of postmaterial and material as problematic. First, the issues that Inglehart points to have not substantially changed in value to the public. Some scholars have found that material issues have remained stable and the postmaterial issue changes that have occurred “do not amount to a net increase in the popularity of these concerns” (Brooks and Manza 1994, 561). Others have found “there is some evidence that the traditional class division is becoming less important, but no sign that the postmaterialist dimension is becoming more important (Weakliem 1991). Regardless of their differences, they both find that Inglehart’s conclusion is false.

For example, in a study of American mayors in 1991, Clark and Lipset found “fiscal and social liberalism were virtually unrelated” for mayors of any age. Clark and Lipset did find, as the mayors got older, the differentiation between fiscal and social liberalism among French mayors is shrinking, which points to a decline in class voting in France. However, the results do not hold true for the United States (Clark and Lipset 1991: 405).

Postmaterial issues- such as environmentalism and feminism - appeal to “issues of personal and societal security.” That is, these issues are designed to boost most people’s “personal well-being and security.” Take, for example, feminism. Many feminist

campaigns push equal pay for equal work, which directly affects material issues. This idea that these so-called postmaterial issues do not affect material well-being is incorrect. Not to mention, the idea that these are new movements are insulting to older generations (Brooks and Manza 1994). These issues have come in waves throughout the United States' history: "second wave" feminism came from 19th and 20th century feminism (e.g. Cott 1987), environmentalism came from the conservation movement (e.g. Warren 2003), and nuclear disarmament came from previous peace movements (e.g. Kleidman 1993).

If Americans are beginning to decide political choices based on non-class based issues, politicians and political campaigns need to respond accordingly. This response must include a shift away from economic issues and a move toward social issues. For example, in the 2012 American presidential election, President Obama's campaign tried to use Mitt Romney's "47 percent" comment to encourage working class voters that Romney did not care about them. The video in which Romney made the remark was released on September 17, after which the President received no boost in support (Corn 2012). On September 17, the average percentage the President was polling was 48.1 percent, while Romney was at 44 percent. A week later, the President was polling 48.2 percent and Romney polled 44.2 percent, no difference between the days (Huffington Post 2012).

### **Hypotheses**

My hypotheses for this paper are going to be split into two parts. In the first, I have three hypotheses. In these, I will to explore how class correlates with basic



political beliefs, namely political party, ideology, and support for an increase in the minimum wage. Hopefully, these will set a baseline understanding of class and its effects. The results of these hypotheses will determine whether the growth of income inequality has led to a more class-based political system or if the reason for political beliefs comes from elsewhere.

My first hypothesis is I believe there will be no correlation between political party preference and self-defined class. Frankly, most of the research about class identity points to a decrease in the strength of class-based voting in the United States (Crewe 1986, Weakliem 1995). Even among the less numerous scholars who argue in support of class-based voting, their admittance that class secularization has happened indicates class-based voting is on the decline (Heath 1991).

My second hypothesis explores the relationship between self-defined class and political ideology. Similar to political party, I posit there will be no correlation between political ideology and self-defined class. Since political party and ideology are typically connected (Highton and Kam 2011), it follows if there is no correlation between political party and self-defined class, there will be no correlation between political ideology and class.

My third hypothesis explores the relationship between self-defined class and support for an increase in the minimum wage. I believe the lower an individual's self-defined class, the more likely they will support an increase in the minimum wage to

\$10.10 an hour.<sup>3</sup> This hypothesis follows the logic that working class individuals are more likely to support policies that liberalism's economic ideals, like raising the minimum wage (Bartels 2006, Brooks and Manza 1994, Weakliem 1991).

In my second set of hypotheses, I will explore how identity politics and postmaterialism are affecting class-based voting. To do so, I will look at the relationship between class, race, support for same-sex marriage, and political party in four hypotheses. If class does not determine political beliefs, these hypotheses will determine from where Virginians get their political beliefs.

First, I believe people who self-identify as "black" will be more likely to identify with the Democratic Party than with the Republican Party, and people who self-identify as "white" will be more likely to identify with the Republican Party than with the Democratic Party, since Americans are moving in the direction of arranging parties behind identity strata (Huckfeldt and Kohfeldt 1989, Edsall and Edsall 1991, Laclau and Mouffe 1985, Heath 1991).

Second, I believe people who support same-sex marriage will be more likely to identify with the Democratic Party than with the Republican Party, and people who oppose same-sex marriage will be more likely to identify with the Republican Party than with the Democratic Party, since Americans are shifting to arranging parties based off postmaterial issues instead of class (Freire 2006, Abramson and Inglehart 1992, Inglehart and Abramson 1994, Inglehart 1990, Gerteis 1998).

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<sup>3</sup> The \$10.10 per hour is not arbitrary. The number is what minimum wage would be if it had been indexed at inflation at its peak in the 1960s.

Third, I hypothesize there will be no correlation between race and support for an increase in the minimum wage. If identity politics are taking over the old, class-based politics, then one's race should not affect how they view economic issues, only their political party preference (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, Heath 1991). Therefore, race may affect how one votes, but not their opinion on the minimum wage.

Finally, I believe there will be no correlation between support for same sex marriage and support for an increase in the minimum wage. Similar to race in my third hypothesis, postmaterial views should have no effect on materialist issues like the minimum wage, affecting only vote choice (Freire 2006, Abramson and Inglehart 1992, Inglehart and Abramson 1994, Inglehart 1990, Gerteis 1998). Support for the minimum wage, therefore, should not be affected by support for same-sex marriage.

## **Methods**

The data I used to test my hypotheses comes from the University of Mary Washington Center for Leadership and Media Studies Fall 2014 survey of Virginia. The survey collects a statewide, representative sample of English interviews of 1,000 Virginian adults aged 18 and older, 500 on landline and 500 on cell phone. The full survey has a margin of error of  $\pm 3.5$  percent. It was conducted from October 1-6, 2014.

Using data from the University of Mary Washington survey does have some drawbacks. First, it has a smaller sample size than a nationwide survey. With only 1,000 respondents, it has a considerably smaller pool than, for example, the thousands-large American National Election Survey. Second, because of the small size of the survey, there are fewer questions to use to check hypotheses. Third, extrapolating data from

Virginia to the whole United States is problematic. Granted, Virginia's political makeup is similar to the entire United States, voting for the two major party candidates in 2012 by almost the same margin as the nation as a whole (Federal Election Commission 2013). However, an argument can be made that Virginia is a miniature United States: low-income west, agricultural south, industrial southeast, and urban, highly educated North. Moreover, Virginia has similar racial makeup to the whole United States, 69 percent white compared to 72 percent white nationally (Farnsworth 2012).

I focused on five questions in the University of Mary Washington survey. For each question, if the respondent volunteered their own answer, answered "don't know," or refused to answer the question, I dropped them from the study. Thankfully, there were only 23 people who responded these ways, just 2.3 percent of respondents. Obviously the reasons why people would not answer about their class or political beliefs is interesting, but not the purpose of this study.

The first question I focused on was, "Would you say you are: upper class, middle class, working class, or lower class?" 5.2 percent of Virginians viewed themselves as members of the upper class, while 45.5 percent, 34.1 percent, and 12.9 percent viewed themselves as members of the middle, working, and lower class, respectively. I recalculated the results into two different social classes: the middle class and the working class. This change left 50.7 percent middle class and 47.0 percent working class.

The second question I focused on asked "Generally speaking do you consider yourself a Democrat, a Republican, or an independent?" A plurality of Virginians identify

with the Democratic Party, 35.7 percent. The second most likely response was independent, at 34.7 percent. Respondents were least likely to identify with the Republican Party, with just 25.2 percent of Virginians doing so.

The third question deals with respondents' political ideology. They were asked "In general, would you describe your political views as very liberal, liberal, moderate, conservative, or very conservative?" Due to the size of the sample, I chose to condense this question into a three-part ideology scale, rather than the original five-part ideology scale. This left me with three groups: liberal, moderate, and conservative. After this alteration, there were 22.4 percent liberal, 38.2 percent moderate, and 34.4% conservative.

The fourth question asks respondents about their views on raising the minimum wage: "Would you support or oppose Congress passing legislation that would raise the minimum wage in this country from \$7.25 per hour to \$10.10 per hour?" 67.5 percent of respondents supported raising the wage to \$10.10 per hour, while 30.3 percent opposed the measure.

The fifth question deals with the respondent's race, asking, "What is your race? Are you white, black, Asian, or some other race?" 77 percent of respondents identified themselves as white, while 18.6 percent identified themselves as black. I chose to limit discussion to just white and black, because the survey data I used made it impossible to use other backgrounds. I would have like to use other races, but the small sample size made that impossible.

The sixth question asks respondents about their views on the legalization of same-sex marriage: “Do you favor or oppose allowing gay and lesbian couples to marry legally in Virginia?” Exactly 50 percent of respondents supported legalizing same-sex marriage in Virginia, while 42 percent of respondents opposed legalizing same-sex marriage in Virginia.

Unfortunately, respondents’ views on same-sex marriage are not a perfect question for determining post-materialism. While many post-material authors mention same-sex marriage as a contributing factor to the decline in class voting (e.g. Abramson and Inglehart 1992), same-sex marriage is affected by issues like religiosity, which skews results. However, I was constrained by questions asked in the poll, and same-sex marriage was the best postmaterialist option in the survey.

## **Analysis**

(Table one about here)

To test my first hypothesis in my first set of data exploring basic political beliefs, I compared people’s self-defined class against their party identification. With a Pearson Chi-Square significance of .616, these data show that there is not a significant correlation between respondents’ self-defined class and their political party preference. My hypothesis was, therefore, correct. I assume this lack of a significant relationship between these data as meaning postmaterial and identity issues have led to a breakdown of class-based voting, like scholars have pointed out (Crewe 1986, Weakliem 1995). Therefore, there must be some other variable that affects how Virginians choose their political party.

(Table two about here)

To test my second hypothesis, I compared people's self-defined class against their political ideology. Similar to political party, the relationship between self-defined class and political ideology was not trustworthy, with a Pearson Chi-Square significance of .234. The lack of correlation proved my hypothesis correct. Again, similar to political party, the close relationship between political ideology and political party (Highton and Kam 2011) and the breakdown of class-based party preference as mentioned above has likely led to this statistical insignificance (Crewe 1986, Weakliem 1995).

(Table three about here)

To test my third hypothesis, I compared people's self-defined class against their support for an increase in the minimum wage. Poor people were the most supportive of the increase, as expected. The data for this hypothesis were statistically significant, with a Chi-Square significance of .049. The data also have a Cramer's V value of .064, meaning they have an extremely weak- but statistically significant- relationship. However, these data point to the significance of American's class structure regarding materialist issues, despite the fact class has no effect on political party preference, as shown in hypothesis one. The data did prove my hypothesis correct, with a higher percentage of the working class, 72.7 percent, supporting an increase in the minimum wage than the middle class, 66.9 percent. These results stem from working class's support for the historically liberal tradition of supporting working class economic issues (Bartels 2006, Brooks and Manza 1994, Weakliem 1991).

From the data above, we can conclude class correlates neither with political party nor political ideology, but class does correlate with support for an increase in the minimum wage. What it does not answer, however, is why Virginians vote the way they do. My second set of hypotheses hopes to shine some light on this issue.

(Table four about here)

To test my first hypothesis in my second set of hypotheses, I compared respondents' race with their political party preference. The result had a near perfect Chi-Square significance, .001, although it had a very strong relationship with a Cramer's V value of .461. These data present a significant finding: there is a strong relationship between an individual's political party preference and an individual's race. The results also proved my hypothesis correct, with African Americans being much more likely to support the Democratic Party than the Republican Party, and white Americans being more likely to support the Republican Party than the Democratic Party. 75 percent of African Americans identified as members of the Democratic Party, while only four percent identified Republicans. 28 percent of white Americans viewed themselves as Democrats, while 32 percent identified as Republicans. For this survey, these results seem to confirm theorists' observations of a movement to racial, identity-based political parties, rather than class-based political parties (Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989, Edsall and Edsall 1991, Laclau and Mouffe 1985, Heath 1991).

(Table five about here)

I found similar results when testing my second hypothesis. For it, I compared the data for those who support same-sex marriage with the data for political party. The



results were statistically significant with a Chi Square of .001 and had a very strong relationship with a Cramer's V of .288. Similar to race and political party preference, these results show there is a relationship between postmaterial issues and political party preference. The results supported my hypothesis, with respondents who support same-sex marriage being more likely to support the Democratic Party than the Republican Party, and respondents who oppose same-sex marriage being more likely to support the Republican Party than the Democratic Party. 44 percent of respondents who support same-sex marriage identify as Democrats, while only 15 percent of respondents who support same-sex marriage identify as Republicans. On the other hand, 41 percent of respondents who oppose same-sex marriage view themselves as Republicans, while only 28 percent of the same group respondents who oppose same-sex marriage view themselves as Democrats. Again, similar to race, these results seem to confirm theorists' observations of a movement to postmaterial, identity-based political parties, rather than class-based political parties (Freire 2006, Abramson and Inglehart 1992, Inglehart and Abramson 1994, Inglehart 1990, Gerteis 1998).

(Table six about here)

To test my third hypothesis, I compared race with support for the minimum wage. The data were statistically significant, with a near perfect Chi-Square significance of .001 and with a weak relationship with a Cramer's V value of .258, meaning there is a very strong relationship between these two issues. Unfortunately, these data prove my hypothesis incorrect. Although both races were overwhelmingly likely to support an increase in the minimum wage, African Americans in particular supported the measure,

with 89 percent in support and only 11 percent opposed. Whites also supported an increase in the minimum wage, but at a lower level than African Americans. 65 percent of white respondents supported the measure, while 36 percent opposed it. These results were surprising, considering research did not allude to race having an effect on materialist issues (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, Heath 1991).

(Table seven about here)

For my fourth and final hypothesis, I compared support for same sex marriage with support for an increase in the minimum wage. Similar to race and support for an increase in the minimum wage, the results were statistically significant, with a near perfect significance of .001. These results also had a strong relationship, with a Cramer's V value of .179. These data disprove my hypothesis. Again, people were overwhelmingly in support of increasing the minimum wage; however those who supported same-sex marriage were more likely to support increasing the minimum wage than those who oppose same-sex marriage. 77 percent of those who support same-sex marriage support increasing the minimum wage versus 60 percent of those who do not support same-sex marriage. These results contradict postmaterialist theories, which never indicate a relationship between support for same-sex marriage and support for increasing the minimum wage (Freire 2006, Abramson and Inglehart 1992, Inglehart and Abramson 1994, Inglehart 1990, Gerteis 1998).

This project attempted to test the why the last two hypotheses contradicted the literature using the data, but the data came back statistically insignificant. For example, I took the same variables from my third hypothesis in my second set (race and support

for an increase in the minimum wage) and controlled for class. If I had been able to show that working class African Americans were more likely to support the minimum wage than upper class African Americans and working class whites were more likely to support the minimum wage than upper class whites, then the above point would have been moot. Unfortunately though, the data were insignificant.

### **Discussion and Conclusion**

From my data there arises a very clear conclusion: for Virginians at least, class does not affect people's voting habits the way past scholars here hypothesized class impacted United States politics. Class voting is minimal, with the data showing there is not a significant relationship between classes and voting behaviors anymore. Voting decisions, like political party preference, therefore, must come from other places instead.

However, class does still matter for some issues. It still matters for materialist issues like support for the minimum wage, which continues to have its highest support from the lower classes. Second, while there is no correlation between class and political party preference, there is a connection between race and same-sex marriage and class and political party preference. This relationship is likely due to a rise in postmaterial ideals among Americans when choosing political parties, as illustrated by some theorists (Inglehart 1990, Abramson and Inglehart 1992, Inglehart and Abramson 1994, Heath 1991).

However, the discussion does not stop there. There are a number of other issues that arise from these data. First, the bulk of data relating to the class-based politics is

decades old, most of it coming from the early 1990s. Presumably, the United States has changed since then. Of course, the reason for the lack of recent research could come from the lack of correlation between class and voting patterns, but I think more attention should be paid to the reason Americans are voting against their economic self-interest. The United States is changing, after all. With the rise in income inequality, materialist issues could become more important in the future, meaning us, as political scientists, cannot let this issue lie fallow.

Second, the conclusions I draw here could be expanded if a nationwide survey is used. While it is useful to understand why people are not voting on class lines in Virginia, an explanation for the entire United States would be even more useful. Moreover, although Virginia may be similar to a smaller United States, it has some differences from the entire nation as well. For example, Virginia is a so-called “right to work” state, meaning union membership is not compulsory if workers vote to organize. This anti-union law could affect how working class Virginians view politics.

Third, the University of Mary Washington poll, while it did provide me with an excellent data set for Virginia, was missing some elements that could have added to my project. For example, the only postmaterial question I was able to study was the question about support for same-sex marriage. While support for same-sex marriage is one of the key elements of postmaterialism, there are other nuances that affect how one views same-sex marriage, like one’s religion and religiosity. Unfortunately, there were no questions about religion in the University of Mary Washington survey, so I was not able to control for religion. It would also have been beneficial to have other options for

postmaterial issues as well. The University of Mary Washington poll did not have questions dealing with women's issues, the environment, or other postmaterial issues. These issues could have shed more light on the effects of postmaterialism.

Fourth, the theories do not account for longitudinal fluctuations caused by income inequality in the United States, which could raise the amount of class-based political party preference. It would be intriguing to see how the data have changed over time, and to see whether the class-based party data have dropped drastically. These data would be particularly interesting to see considering the meteoric rise in inequality (Dadush 2012). Also interesting to see would be to see the longitudinal effects of postmaterial and race on class. If Americans are increasingly forming dichotomous opinions on these issues, then the arguments would be even stronger.

Finally, and most importantly, there is much more research that needs to be done to find how people arrive at their political beliefs and with which political party they identify. Although some of my data point to postmaterial issues being the an important reason why people identify with their political party, the analysis of my third and fourth hypotheses in my second set of hypotheses point to larger picture. If postmaterial issues were the sole determinant of political party preference, there should be no relationship between postmaterial issues and material issues. However, both the relationship between race and support for minimum wage and the relationship between support for same-sex marriage and support for minimum wage were significant. Not only that, these policies also line up with the views of the Democratic Party, which leads me to question whether people's political views could be affected by their party

preference. That is, party preference, race, postmaterial issues, and class all weave an intricate web that creates Americans political beliefs.

## Appendix

Table 1:

### Crosstabs

#### Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Self-Identified Class * Political Party	939	93.9%	61	6.1%	1000	100.0%

#### Self-Identified Class \* Political Party Crosstabulation

			Political Party			Total
			Democratic	Independent	Republican	
Self-Identified Class	Middle Class	171	132	132	171	483
		35.4%	27.3%	27.3%	35.4%	100.0%
		50.1%	54.1%	54.1%	50.1%	51.4%
		18.2%	14.1%	14.1%	18.2%	51.4%
	Working Class	170	112	112	170	456
		37.3%	24.6%	24.6%	37.3%	100.0%
		49.9%	45.9%	45.9%	49.9%	48.6%
		18.1%	11.9%	11.9%	18.1%	48.6%
	Total	Count	341	244	341	939
		% within Self-Identified Class	36.3%	26.0%	36.3%	100.0%
		% within Political Party	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	36.3%	26.0%	36.3%	100.0%

#### Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2- sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.968 <sup>a</sup>	2	.616
Likelihood Ratio	.969	2	.616
Linear-by-Linear Association	.031	1	.861
N of Valid Cases	939		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 118.49.

#### Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.032	.616
	Cramer's V	.032	.616
N of Valid Cases		939	

Table 2:

**Crosstabs**

**Case Processing Summary**

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Self-Identified Class * Political Ideology	932	93.2%	68	6.8%	1000	100.0%

**Self-Identified Class \* Political Ideology Crosstabulation**

			Political Ideology			Total
			Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	
Self-Identified Class	2.00	Count	122	201	168	491
		% within SubClass2part1	24.8%	40.9%	34.2%	100.0%
		% within ideo2	55.2%	53.9%	49.7%	52.7%
		% of Total	13.1%	21.6%	18.0%	52.7%
	3.00	Count	99	172	170	441
		% within SubClass2part1	22.4%	39.0%	38.5%	100.0%
		% within ideo2	44.8%	46.1%	50.3%	47.3%
		% of Total	10.6%	18.5%	18.2%	47.3%
Total		Count	221	373	338	932
		% within SubClass2part1	23.7%	40.0%	36.3%	100.0%
		% within ideo2	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	23.7%	40.0%	36.3%	100.0%

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.983 <sup>a</sup>	2	.371
Likelihood Ratio	1.983	2	.371
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.800	1	.180
N of Valid Cases	932		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 104.57.

**Symmetric Measures**

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.046	.371
	Cramer's V	.046	.371
N of Valid Cases		932	



Table 3:

**Crosstabs**

**Case Processing Summary**

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Self-Identified Class * Minimum Wage	957	95.7%	43	4.3%	1000	100.0%

**Self-Identified Class \* Minimum Wage Crosstabulation**

			Minimum Wage		Total
			Support	Oppose	
Self-Identified Class	Middle Class	Count	331	164	495
		% within Self-Identified Class	66.9%	33.1%	100.0%
		% within Minimum Wage	49.6%	56.6%	51.7%
		% of Total	34.6%	17.1%	51.7%
Working Class	Working Class	Count	336	126	462
		% within Self-Identified Class	72.7%	27.3%	100.0%
		% within Minimum Wage	50.4%	43.4%	48.3%
		% of Total	35.1%	13.2%	48.3%
Total		Count	667	290	957
		% within Self-Identified Class	69.7%	30.3%	100.0%
		% within Minimum Wage	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	69.7%	30.3%	100.0%

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2- sided)	Exact Sig. (2- sided)	Exact Sig. (1- sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	3.883 <sup>a</sup>	1	.049		
Continuity Correction <sup>b</sup>	3.611	1	.057		
Likelihood Ratio	3.893	1	.048		
Fisher's Exact Test				.049	.029
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.879	1	.049		
N of Valid Cases	957				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 140.00.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

**Symmetric Measures**

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.064	.049
	Cramer's V	.064	.049
N of Valid Cases		957	

Table 4:

**Crosstabs**

**Case Processing Summary**

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Race * Political Party	796	79.6%	204	20.4%	1000	100.0%

**Race \* Political Party Crosstabulation**

			Political Party			Total
			Democratic	Republican	Independent	
Race	White	Count	146	220	249	615
		% within Race	23.7%	35.8%	40.5%	100.0%
		% within Political Party	51.8%	96.9%	86.8%	77.3%
		% of Total	18.3%	27.6%	31.3%	77.3%
	Black	Count	136	7	38	181
		% within Race	75.1%	3.9%	21.0%	100.0%
		% within Political Party	48.2%	3.1%	13.2%	22.7%
		% of Total	17.1%	0.9%	4.8%	22.7%
	Total	Count	282	227	287	796
		% within Race	35.4%	28.5%	36.1%	100.0%
		% within Political Party	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	35.4%	28.5%	36.1%	100.0%

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	168.935 <sup>a</sup>	2	.001
Likelihood Ratio	176.007	2	.001
Linear-by-Linear Association	98.199	1	.001
N of Valid Cases	796		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 51.62.

**Symmetric Measures**

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.461	.001
	Cramer's V	.461	.001
N of Valid Cases		796	

Table 5:

**Crosstabs**

**Case Processing Summary**

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Same-Sex Marriage * Political Party	888	88.8%	112	11.2%	1000	100.0%

**Same-Sex Marriage \* Political Party Crosstabulation**

			Political Party			Total
			Democratic	Republican	Independent	
Same-Sex Marriage	Support	Count	214	74	198	486
		% within Same-Sex Marriage	44.0%	15.2%	40.7%	100.0%
		% within Political Party	65.8%	31.2%	60.7%	54.7%
		% of Total	24.1%	8.3%	22.3%	54.7%
Oppose	Count	111	163	128	402	
		% within Same-Sex Marriage	27.6%	40.5%	31.8%	100.0%
		% within Political Party	34.2%	68.8%	39.3%	45.3%
		% of Total	12.5%	18.4%	14.4%	45.3%
Total	Count	325	237	326	888	
		% within Same-Sex Marriage	36.6%	26.7%	36.7%	100.0%
		% within Political Party	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	36.6%	26.7%	36.7%	100.0%

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	73.810 <sup>a</sup>	2	.001
Likelihood Ratio	74.659	2	.001
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.696	1	.193
N of Valid Cases	888		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 107.29.

**Symmetric Measures**

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.288	.001
	Cramer's V	.288	.001
N of Valid Cases		888	

Table 6:

**Crosstabs**

**Case Processing Summary**

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Race * Minimum Wage	809	80.9%	191	19.1%	1000	100.0%

**Race \* Minimum Wage Crosstabulation**

			Minimum Wage		Total
			Support	Oppose	
Race	White	Count	372	251	623
		% within Race	59.7%	40.3%	100.0%
		% within Minimum Wage	69.3%	92.3%	77.0%
		% of Total	46.0%	31.0%	77.0%
	Black	Count	165	21	186
		% within Race	88.7%	11.3%	100.0%
		% within Minimum Wage	30.7%	7.7%	23.0%
		% of Total	20.4%	2.6%	23.0%
Total	Count	537	272	809	
	% within Race	66.4%	33.6%	100.0%	
	% within Minimum Wage	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	66.4%	33.6%	100.0%	

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	53.971 <sup>a</sup>	1	.001		
Continuity Correction <sup>b</sup>	52.679	1	.001		
Likelihood Ratio	61.928	1	.001		
Fisher's Exact Test				.001	.001
Linear-by-Linear Association	53.904	1	.001		
N of Valid Cases	809				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 62.54.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

**Symmetric Measures**

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.258	.001
	Cramer's V	.258	.001
N of Valid Cases		809	

Table 7:

**Crosstabs**

**Case Processing Summary**

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Same-Sex Marriage * Minimum Wage	901	90.1%	99	9.9%	1000	100.0%

**Same-Sex Marriage \* Minimum Wage Crosstabulation**

			Minimum Wage		Total
			Support	Oppose	
Same-Sex Marriage	Support	Count	377	113	490
		% within Same-Sex Marriage	76.9%	23.1%	100.0%
		% within Minimum Wage	60.3%	40.9%	54.4%
		% of Total	41.8%	12.5%	54.4%
	Oppose	Count	248	163	411
		% within Same-Sex Marriage	60.3%	39.7%	100.0%
		% within Minimum Wage	39.7%	59.1%	45.6%
		% of Total	27.5%	18.1%	45.6%
	Total	Count	625	276	901
% within Same-Sex Marriage		69.4%	30.6%	100.0%	
% within Minimum Wage		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
% of Total		69.4%	30.6%	100.0%	

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	28.980 <sup>a</sup>	1	.001		
Continuity Correction <sup>b</sup>	28.204	1	.001		
Likelihood Ratio	28.990	1	.001		
Fisher's Exact Test				.001	.001
Linear-by-Linear Association	28.947	1	.001		
N of Valid Cases	901				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 125.90.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

**Symmetric Measures**

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.179	.001
	Cramer's V	.179	.001
N of Valid Cases		901	

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