Date of Award

Spring 5-3-2024

Document Type

Honors Project

Degree Name

Bachelor of Science

Department

Economics

Department Chair or Program Director

Dr. Don Lee

First Advisor

Brad Hansen

Second Advisor

Don Lee

Third Advisor

Amrita Dhar

Major or Concentration

Economics

Abstract

Antitrust enforcement on the federal level has clear partisan influences; Democrats usually support expansive enforcement regimes while Republicans oppose them. On the state level, the ideological divide appears muddled. State attorneys general, who are mostly elected officials, are responsible for initiating lawsuits. This study seeks to determine whether state attorneys general mirror their federal counterpart in enforcing antitrust law on a partisan basis or whether unique state variables such as economic factors overwhelm ideological motivations. Public choice theory dictates politicians prioritize re-election and will adhere to constituent interest, thus providing the theoretical foundation for why politicians may tailor antitrust enforcement to their voters. Using panel data from all fifty states from 2009-2023, political factors seem irrelevant to whether a state attorney general is a plaintiff on a competition law case while economic indicators such as median household income and unemployment rate robustly predict enforcement. The implications are plentiful: state attorneys general might be gaining autonomy, the nature of antitrust lawsuits could be shifting, and the same political party may have different ideologies contingent upon the constituency.

Download

Share

COinS